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The Response of Stock Prices to
Changes in Weekly Money and the
Discount Rate
B. W. Ha/er
I ~ON~tfll RAhI I fl St tidi hIS hrIii di ~ott tl to in
alvzing the effects of weekly changes in the ii onev
stock (MI on interest rates ~md exchange rates,’ lit
general, the its tilts of this research are consis tent
with the efficient markets hypothesis, whici holds
that only unexpected changes in the rrionev stock
should significantly affect interest rates and exchange
‘ates.’ Few ofthese studies how ever’ have investigated
the reaction of stock prices to the tveeklv money
announcetnent: the purpose ol this article is to pro—
some evtdence on this effect.
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‘The surveys by Cornell (1983) and Sheehan (1985) contain numer~
ous references to the literature on this subject.
‘Alternative evidence is presented in He/n (1985), and Falk and
Orazem (1985).
Pearce and Roley (1983. 1985) find that stock prices react only to
unanticipated changes in money and, for the most part, show no
statistical relationship to either unanticipated or expected move-
ments of other economic news. Hardouvelis (1985) reports that
stock prices react to unanticipated movements in four monetary
measures (Ml,net freereserves, the discount rate and the discount
rate surcharge). as well as three non-monetary measures (trade
deficit, unemployment rate and personal income). Although few
studies have examined the weeklymoney’stock-price relationship,
numerous studies have studied the longer-term reaction of stock
prices tomovements in money. Among others, see Sprinkel (1964),
Rozeff (1974). Sorensen (1982) and Davidson and Froyen (1982).
Various studies also have examined the behavior of stock
prices to announcements of different types of information. For
example. Schwert (1981) examines the reaction of stock prices to
the announcement of inflation data: Fama. et. at. (1969) study the
effects of stock splits; Lloyd~Daviesand Canes (1978) investigate
the effects of stock analysts published recommendations: and
Niederhofler (1971) analyses the reaction of stock prices to world
events.
‘this paper extends previous itse~tr’c.lion the r’eac—
ion of stock prices to mo netan’ ‘‘news’’ in several
ways. First, it covers a hroader tinie per’ioc I, horn Sep—
tember 1977 thu ugh I)eceniher’ I984, than most pre-
vious studies. ‘this allows one to test whether’ tlie
changes ill monetary policy operatit ig proced t ‘es in
Cctotie ‘ 1979 and October 1982 mu uenced the nt—
sponse of stock prices to changes in the money stock
and the discount rate.’
Secorid, utilike prevtor is studies, this st tidy uses
both broad and indust n’—specific measu ‘es of stock
prices to determine ifgeneral marketeffects also occur’
inn iforrnilv across in specitic industry groups;’ As
noted by King 119661:
it is intuitively appealuig to think of icoririog
iutor’niation as filling into various classes according to
the scope of its eltect on the market. ‘there is sonic
news of a rrionetar’v nature, br’ example. which is
hound lo have a market—wide irripact on security price.
‘the magnitude of impact need riot, howe’’cr’. lie the
same tot’ all stocks. p. 1401
AItbough nomen rits studies have attempted to deter’—
mine optimal groupings ofindividual stocks based on t
their’ relative movements o’’er’ tniie, little has been
done to investigate the relative response ol difler’enit
stock groups to the same piece of economic in—
tor’titation,
‘A discussion of the October 1982 change in policy procedures can
be found in Wallich (1984) and Gilbert (1985).
‘Most previous research focuses solely on the broad market effects.
For example, Pearce and Roley (1983) usethe Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average while Pearce and Roley (1985) use the Standard and
Poor’s 500 index. In an approach similarto that used in this study,
Hardouvelis examines the effect of new information on several
different stock price measures.Finally, unlike most pn’eviotis work, which pn’e—
sunied that the reaction of stock prices was synilnitetn’ic
with respect to tnnianitieipated increases on’ deen’ntases
in money, this paper tests for’ the separate etIèc,t of
positive and negative t.nnexpected changes in Mt. ‘Ibis
pen’ntits one lo test Ion’ market efficiency in a sonriewlial
thflerent ntannen’ than simpkv testing for the signifi-
cance of expected and unexpected changes in
11(11 y
The efticientt nnan’kets hvptitliesis sttggests that.
when expected changes in the money stock occur.
tliex’have no significant effect oil stork prices hecause
they already have heent incorporated into sectnr’itv
prices. Onh’ unexpected changes iii the money stock
affect stock pt’ices according to this hypothesis.’
Several hypotheses have been suggested to explain
why stock prices react to unexpected changes ml the
money stock.’ ‘t’lie e,vpecled inflation In/potlnesis sttg—
gests that an unnexpected increase iii the money stock
incn’eases nnan’ket participants’ expectalions of in—
flalion. leading to higher’ interest rates viathe so—called
Fishen’effect. Ifthe increase in interest rates lowers the
pn’esent ~‘alueof eorpon’ations discoinnited cash flows,
stock prices will kill whenever investon’s observe an]
unexpected increase in the money stock.’l’liis livpotli—
esized response does riot occur’. Inoweven’, tinder’ cen’—
tam t’estnctive conditions, Cix’en perfect markets and
no taxes, for example, changes in expected inflation
would have no efibct on stock prices, hecause ex-
pected increases in nominal cash (lows would offset
‘Cornell, Pearce and Roley (1985) and Hardouvelis provide no
evidence on this issue as it relates to stock price effects. Pearce and
Roley (1983) present evidence on the response of stock prices
whenmoney deviates from announced long-run target ranges. Their
tests are based on separating unanticipated money into positive
surprises above target, negative surprises below target and all
others. In general. their results indicate that the different surprise
measures are not statistically different in their effect. There is,
however, some evidence of a different effect of positive surprises
across the different policy regimes.
‘As Sheehan (1985) notes, the unexpected change in the money
stock provides new information about money stock developments
that already have occurred. That is because the money stock is
announced with a lag. Thus, the announcement causes market
participants to revise their forecasts for future policy actions apart
from previously held expectations only if the announced money
stock change is different from its expected change.
Ihe effect of increases in the rate at which those flows
ate discounted.’ A large litera ttire addresses these
conditions, showing that they generally are not
funhilled.” Based on these st uclies, wInch indicate that
stock prices n’eact negatively to inflation, the expected
inflation hypothesis suggests that stock prices should
fill fol fowing the announcement of an unexpected
increase in the money stock.
An alternative lwpot hesis, the policy anticipa//o/is
ln’pothesis, views an unnexpecled change in the niiontt,v
stock as a signal Ihat alter’s nran’ket perceptions of
ftnttnn’e nnonetary policy. Presinnring that the change is
perceived as pen’nnanenit or’ that the Federal Reserve is
slow to n’espond to unexpected deviations in the
nliotiey stock away tt’onn its target level, interest rates
will n’ise as the public expects the Fed to otfset the
unexpected increase iii the money stock, Louise—
quetitly.ari unniexpected incn’ease inn the money stock
mtplies greaten’ luntinn’e tightening of credit availability,
which results in higher’ inten’est n’ates, Re:ause the
higher’ inten’est rates reduce the p ‘escot value of this—
counted cash flows, stock pn’ic~s an’e Iwpotliesize to
decline,
t”inially, the money cle,nwnd or real activity ln’pollie—
s/s assen’ts that money announcements I)r’ovide itifon’—
matioti ahot.nt future money demand. Suppose that
man’ket partici~ )ants inter’pn’et all inmix ected in cn’ease
in the money stock as a signal that then’e has been a
permanent incr’east.t in money demand. If titonex’ de—
mand depenc Is on expect ccl future output, t Ilen the
unexpected increase in money dennand indicates that
future out put will he higher than pr’evitnnslv ex-
pected.’’ Consequentlv~the incn’ease in expected cash
‘This discussion abstracts from the distinction of net monetary credi-
tors and net monetary debtors. For a discussion of the effects of
changes in inflation expectations on each group, see Kessel and
Alchian (1962). For a more recent study of the effects of intlation On
bank stock prices, used to represent a group of net monetary
creditors, see Santoni (1986).
“For example, Feldstein (1980) discusses the effect of taxes:
Schwert (1981), Fama and Schwert (1977) and Nelson (1976)
examine the inflation’stock price relationship for the United States
while Branch (1974) and Cohn and Lessard (1981) provide evi-
dence from other countries, In general, these studies indicate that
unexpected increases in inflation lower stock prices. Results re-
ported in Kool and Hater (1986), however, suggest that this result
does not hold for earlier time periods.
“Fama (1981) argues that expected inflation in previous studies
serves as a proxy for expected real activity. Consequently, regress-
ing stock prices on expected inflation without accounting for ex-
pected real activity will yield incorrect estimates, Following this line
of reasoning, several researchers have used available survey data
to study the relationship between expected stock price changes.
expected inflation and expected real activity. See, for example,
Gultekin (1983), Pearce (1984), Hasbrouck (1984) and Coate and
VanderHoff(1985). ‘This discussion is basedon Cornell and Sheehan.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1908
flo~x’sproduces an increase in stock prices.” ‘this hy-
pothesis thus pn’edicts that stock prices shoinld in]—
cr’e’tse in response In) an unexpected incn’ease mi the
money stock.
Discount r’att.~ changes nnav he thot nght of as an
indication of cImanges in expected firttire monet any
policy: discount rate changes. in other won’ds affect
Iinanc:ial and stock mltan’kets pn’nman’ihy thn’oitgl’t their
effect on in]ten’est n’ates antI pen’ceptions of hntun’e eco—
nonlic activity.’-’ tn genen’ah , incn’eases in tlie discoin nit
‘ate reduce stock pn’ices because they pn’esage a tigli t—
ening of monetary policx’.’’ ‘the move toward tighter
policy is expected to increase interest r’ates and n’e—
dunce real economic activity at]d, consequenUs’. firtn.nre
con-porate cash flows. Stock pn’icesdccli tie because tie
n’edn.nced future cash flows are discoun]ted at higher
interest rates.
Sonic an’gue that the in]pact ot a disco inn t nate
change depends on the Federal Reserve’s cu n’n’enI ofi—
en’ating pr’ocedn.nn’e.’- If the Fed is tan’getit]g interest
rates, changes in the discot nitt nate may pr’o”R kt no
info mat ion ahoint km tinre p01icy that is not al ‘eatlv
“It should be noted that attendant increases in the ex ante real rate
are presumably more than offset by expected increases in future
real economic activity.
“Batten and Thornton (1995) and Smirlock and Yawitz (1985). for
example, each attempt to determine “technical” from “non-
technical’ changes in the discount rate. Batten and Thornton dichot-
omize discount rate changes into technical or policy-related, based
on Federal Reservestatements, Their procedure assumes that the
change is entirely technical or policy-related.
Smirlock and Yawitz atlempt to definetechnicaland non-technical
discount rate changes byregressing ratechanges on lagged values
of the spread between the federalfunds rate and the discount rate
and lagged values of changes in discount window borrowing. Pre~
dicted values from this equation constitute the technical (or antici-
pated) change, while the regression’s error term constitutes the
non~technical (or unanticipated) change in the discount rate.
Several factors militate against this procedure, First, it does not
capture effects not incorporated in the explanatory variables. Sec-
ond, it may alter the timing of the actual change. Last, it assigns
each discount rate change, which generally is 25, 50 or IOU basis
points, some estimated value that often does not equal the actual
value, In otherwords, there is always some non’technical change.
Because of the problems surrounding these classifications of
discount rate changes, we take the changes to be unanticipated.
“There are instances, however, when moves to raise the discount
rate have been received by the market as good news, precipitating
increases in stock prices. This is discussed in the shaded box on the
next page.
incor’pon’ated in] inten’est rates, If the I”ed is tnsin]g a
n’esen’ve growtIi op erat i rig l~ nocccliire, bIt)weye n’,
changes in the discount n-ate inllnence ititer’est rates.
t)un’ing the period coyen’ed by I his st unity, thn’ee chiffen’—
tnt0 pen’ating pn’ocedtnn’es were insed : it]tet’est ‘ate tan’—
geting Ipci —October t979I : nonbor’n’owed reserves tan’—
geting Ioctohen’ 1979 to October tHS2t : ann I a hon’r’owed
reserves pn’ocettune, whicl t tenuls to sntoot hI r1]ove—
ments in the finrids ‘ate none than nonhor’n’owecI ni—
serves tan’geting Ipost—October tlISZt. ‘h’he empirical
tests below assess the differ’ttnit effects of discount ‘atc
changes utnder’ different policy procedures.
‘the basic equation tested is:
lii L~SP,=a,-fI3,t]M,-l-I3.EM,-f ~IJR,+ftDRS, -I~e,,
when’e
zXSP the fin’st—diffen-ence of the logarithm of the
daily stock pn’i :e index.
UM = the unexpected dollar change in mM
EM = the expected change in N-ti.
t)R “- the change in the discotnnt ‘ate. antI
11)115 the change in the discount nate sun-change.”
‘I’he effin:ient markets hypothesis sirggests that the
estimatecl coefhcieni t on expected n]onev (:liitn]ges t
shounid be zen’o. If disconti t rate changes in hItnen~ce
stock prices as hypothesized above, ft and ft, will be
ne.gative. l”in]allv, the expected sigt~(31 I~,dit’fen’s de-
pending [npoli the hypothesis being tester I. the policy
anticipation]s and the expected intlatiorn hypotheses
sr.rgges t that it will hut negatEve: tlie t]ionex’ the mlta mmd
hiypotb]esis singgests that it wihl lie positive.
tiesides investigatin]g the validity of several hivpothe—
ses regarding the elfects of nrioney stork an]d discount
nate changes on] stock prices, estimates of equnation]
can be insed to test several other’ t]\’potheses as well:
,~m’ethe effects of the explan]aton’v ~‘an’iablessnatistically
equal acn’oss diftitn’e.n]t nrnon]etanv policy n’egiri]es? Are
tIne ntffects sinnilan’ acn’oss stock price in]dexes? An’e tInt,
ef’tdc,ts of nnontev stock chmanges on stock prices s’.’nn—
t]tetn’ical. as genen’allv is asstnl])ed?
“The discount rate surcharge was used by the Federal Reserve
during the period from March to May 1980 and again during the
period from November 1980 to November 1981. The 1980 imposi-
tionof the surcharge was partof the credit restraint program enacted
by the Carter administration and it was set at 3 percent. During each
period when the surcharge was used, it applied to discount window
borrowings by banks with deposits of $500 million or more that
borrow frequently. Because the surcharge did not apply to all
borrowing. it is included as a separate variable in the regression
equations presented below.
“For example, see Roley and Troll (1984) or Smirlock and Yawitz for
a discussion of this point.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1986 :~
‘l’iining I)iscoti nt Rate Changes
~,lnniins trsimm~disrounil r’,nlm’ cim.nn~r’sulln’rm Iakn’ mmml smncuestnrna IbnI Urn’ imnrm’n’a,t’ irr hr disn’n,nnmnl
Inn ~nmmnnonmtmn’crrrerit chrle as the n
1
,n~ it bn’ccnnmnn’’, ‘ale n’,nllnrmnmed Ilrn’mu,nn’kn’l pn’r’n’eptinmnn thaI lint lid
‘ininhhin_’tlnn~u’minmn’ninrnn’sIht’iinnlnhin’inLimniimnItIir’mmn.~~ \\,n’,r’t’soI\enIlmnnninlinlnmnnnmmn’\;~rnI\\lil~nrr(IImnn’nninnnn’
immiomnnn;ntinmnl Iu,~~,unn’ ml n~ allen tIn,’ n’ninpin’inai thin’ pcnssnhilmlu oh nit’’ innftnlimmn, II no ‘‘barnum’ nnmnh
rv,—’nrils, I ur’e’anmnpie there ,nr’n’ rnccznsinnlis onm nhin’ln Ibis onne mnnnnnnmmmn’r’mrnn’rmt mInIm ln’numn tint’ cia’ it
nlmscnmnrnt r’;ntm n’hnanl!2ns ;nn’n’ ,nmnmn,nmnrnnnnl tIni;i;nu tine carrie eIIet’lnut’ I’m’imlau In lIme nla~it nppt’anenl irn
Im’.nmlinir,~cla~anini,as,ancln, lint’ ar’lmn,nl .nnnnnotnrnn ennmn’nnt It_ill .‘,!,‘vv! _l,,urim;nl \hn,ncizru , tint’
ci,n~u~ihi mlillnr- lr’onin tin, nl,r_\ it is n’,’innjn’tn’,i Ii~ lInt lirnrishriin In,r’orrnn’—,
tirnar’mni;tI imm~esti iinn-,mnn,n’ nil lhni’,, ~ ,nlIn’n Inn’ tIns—
ennumnil r’.nln nhnrrgr ml the tnanimnnM cla~ lh;nl lIne .~sb’.5uO, Unit 11095 t \I, 0572 IlU
ch~niigebeu’nnnnes ellen’ Ii’t’. II I 2 IS 2 ti_i
In nihnnslrule hnnn~~~ernsiliue tine n’esnnlls ni” to iU 0111,5 ~i_ 0’ Ii flU i u.s
,‘himn,m~ts mi lIne limnunng the SPSUO n’n
1




lii, anlrnotnnnn’c’mmnr’ril dim’ ,ns liii nknu u~henrthin- nil’, n’lim’n’ti~nnla~ liin’rini’li’’~nll~ pn’nln’n’.nhnln’ tn chnminl&4 lIt,’
t’mntnrnt r’;nle n’hmrni,n.~n’~niiIi(’imn’n’ni ri tim, thic b\;n/! Sum! anrnrr,nnmnn’n’nnn,’mrt br~ mis nlnhnn’.nnnnlr’e rim
_)(gi/-ir;J/, tnt t’s,,nnrnni,ntinnni ni Inn’ claIm m’e~e;rhedIlnat pn’rss~~econnd the enrnpnn’icnI tiler It. oh de,ccmnnnnn raIn’
mimi I’n’imhnv~‘\nn~ennine h, 1978 lIre mIe,m’nnnnl cur’ u’;ns cinannie,—.n,nn stnmm’b~pn’u’e~appean tmn Inn’ qnniln’ —ent.ilht’
n’.ni~.eci IOU tiasis pmrirnts thimin’i, the nr’rdmnn
4
cIa~ \r Inn small hinnnnn1~change~ inn this exnnnrpbn’ chrannuirne
t’nrtinnl’, irn lint’ t\ ;n1/.Sur~’t ,lon,i’in;gI inn] \Inrrichn~;tltr In nun olnsnn’\ £rtirnnn r’n’\n’n’s’t. lint si~tni rn rr I sn~nrihin’.nntn’n’
nmtr’ thin stm,n’k lime n’;nllu ‘‘ml i nicI,nu In; thin arinmmnmnnin’r ni tin, discount ‘rIm’ t,rr’nrlhe
‘to assess these questions. eqitation I was estinnated
ulsir]g daily stock pr’icdt data lr’om Septennben’ 23. t977.
thm’oimgh tjeceniben’ 3t , 1984. ‘three zen’o—on]e dunnnni~’
yan’iabies tyen’eused to differentiate tIle periods associ-
ated with alternative monetary policy regimes. ‘h’h]tns,
Dl = I fr-cnn Septennhen’ 23, 1977, tlin’on.ngh October’ 5.
1979, zero elsewhien’e: 1)2 = I from October 5, t979,
hr’oingh October 15, t982, zero elsewh er’e:ar~ ch D:i =
after’ Octoben’ IS, 1982. zen’o elsewhen’m,, in]ten’action]
terms are for’m]]ed 1w ninultiplvintg each explal]atorv
variable by these dunrnniiy yan’iables.’’ ton’ exaniiple.
IlIUM repn’esents the effec,t of UNI in~the first sinbpe—
niod, D2t mN-I the effect t
1inning II ~e second arid so on i
lable 1 presents the n’esmnits of estininating equnatiom] 1
using these miter-action) terms and tIle various stuck
price indexes,’’
As the efficient nitan’kets hypothesis p-edicts, the
expected cl’manige it] Ml mI’lMm does not sign]iticanltly
mtffec,t stock pnme changes. ‘line ‘esunIts in table I inidi—
cate that ~ommof the IS estinnated coettic.ien]ts on]
expected money is statistically sign]ificant at the 5
percent level of sign]ilical]re. ‘lIne test n’esinlts in table 2
also bean’ ourt the etlicienit u]an’kets l]_vpothesis~as the
n’epon’ted F—statistics cannot ‘eject the hwputh]esis that
the coefticierits 01] the expected change in] ni]on]ey
together’ an’e mn]sigr]iticantlv clilter’ent fn’onii zero. ‘t’i]uns,
the livpotl]esis tI]at the estimated coeliicients tin ex-
pected motley are zen’o arvro,s,s the clitjeu’eot ,mno,nctaiu’
regmne~sis not m’eiected hwthe data,
its predicted by the expec:ted inflation and policy
anticipations hypotheses. hut counter’ to the n]ot]e½’
“Because the discount rate surcharge variable enters only during the
second subsample, no interaction term is necessary. Also, the
choice of October15 for the 1982 policy change is arbitrary, since
published accounts ot the procedural change do not provide an
exact date.
“Note that equation I is estimated without day-of-the-week variables.
Previous analysis by Pearce and Roley (1985) using the same data
finds that the presence or absence of these variables did not
influence their results, Given this evidence and the fact that we are
using the same data, we alsoomit day~of~the-week variables. Other
evidence on the existence of day-of-the~weekeffects, much of it
conflicting, are reported in French (1980) and Gibbons and Hess
(1981).
Following Pearce and Roley (1985) and Hardouvelis, we also
included several other measures of economic news’ as explana-
tory variables in equation 1. Those results indicated that stock
prices, irrespective of the index, responded to monetary announce-
ments more reliably than the other measures, such as unexpected
inflation,economic activity or unemployment. Because the results of
these tests do not extend the analysis already provided by Pearce
and Roley, we do not report them here.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OFSt LOUIS MARCH 1968
TableI
Estimates of Equation 1
Index
Variable SPSOO SP400 SPTRAN SPUTIL SPAN
Constant 0.025 0025 0027 0,012 0.018
(1 20) (114) (098) (086) (080)
DIIJM 0100 0.104 0164 0.037 0060
(1,81) (181) (229) (1,02) (103)
D2UM —0124 0120 —0.067 0129 -0149
(384) (358) (1 60) (6.05) (437)
D3UM 0112 —0114 0091 —0119 0,125
(2.46) (241) (1.54) (3 96) (2 60J
DiEM 0,072 0077 0105 0038 0033
(114) (118) (129) (087) (050)
D2EM 0.072 0073 0101 0048 0031
(137) (1,34) (149) (140) (056)
D3EM 0034 0037 0021 0022 0094
(0 74) (0,77) (0 34) (0 72) (1 92)
01DB 0916 1,038 1 89 0259 0944
(177) (1,91) ( 76) (0 6) (172)
02DB 0,597 0 599 0332 0282 0 448
(235) (227) (101) (1,69) (167)
03DB 208 1315 1412 0269 0-336
(154) (1,61) (1 38) (052) (041)
DRS 0432 0,4 1 0501 —0543 —0658
(266) (2,48) (2.36) (508) (3.83)
B 0020 0018 0009 0039 0021
SE 0B77 0913 116 0.596 095
OW 1,79 182 2.00 198 2-01
p 0,19 026 023
(831) (1136) (988)
NOT Absolutevalue of t-statistncsaereportedtnparentheses B nsthe coeffncrentofdetermrnation
adjusted for degrees offreedom; S rs the reg suon standard erro DW ts the Durbin Watson test
stattsttc and pnsthe estnmate of thefirst ordersernat corretatnon coeffncment. Thed pendentvariables are
measured as trst differences ofthe bogarnthms o standard and Poo 5 500 (SP500) 400 stock nndex
(SP400) th transportatmon nndex (SPTRAN), theutittty nndex (SPUTbL) and theftnan rat nrldex (SPFtt4)
Theright hand-side measures are unexpected tranges (tiM)and a pected changes n Ml (EM) based
on the Money Market Servrce bnc survey DR and DRS rep esent the percentage change n the
Federal Rose v ‘s drscount rate and urcha go rae, respect’tv by Theterm Dl, 02 and 03 represent
(0 I)dummyvarrabies whereDl 1 from Sep ember23 1977,through October 5 1979 0etsewhere
02 1 from October 5 1979 through October 15 1982, 0 elsewhere and 03 1 from October 15,
982, o December31 1984 Ge sewhere
demand hypothr’ is innanttcipatcd change~ iii Mi pated money stock changes do atfe .t stock pm ices. the
(1 Mm generalh ha~ eastatistic ably signifu ant, negative results on line 3 i-eject the claim that unatittctpated
tIllf)ct( t on stock pn’ues. I or’instarlc e, an unantic ipated changes in Mi have no effect, the icsufts on tine 4,
Si billion tncr’ease tn Mi r’educed the growth t’~ttt.of which test the c.qiualitv ot the estumatc d coefficients
the SP300 and the SP400 by about it) 12 and 11 basis across the different policy peniods indic ate that onc
points ac n Os’, th thn-c pc-nods tcsted. Die results iii cannot r’e;ect coeflncient stability at the per-cent level.




Hypothesis SF500 SP400 SPTRAN SPUTIL SPAN
DiEM 02 M 03 M—o 123 124 133 108 1,41
(030) (029) (0 26) (0 36) (0,24)
DIEM — D2EM D3EM 019 017 120 0.16 046
(0 83) (0 84) (0 30) (0 85) (~63)
O UM D2UM = D3UM 0 8,04 731 3,40 1781 896
(0 00) (~00) (0 02) (0 00) (0,00)
D1UM D2UM D3UM 008 003 068 248 ~88
(0 92) (097) (051) (008) (0 42)
01DB 02DB D3DR 0 3.68 381 200 124 197
(001) (001) (011) (029) (011)
D1DR — 02DB 03DB 515 547 297 103 2,78
(001) (000) (005) (0-36) (006)
NOTE, Marginal significance bevels are reported tn parentheses Variable defrnrtrons are found rn
table I
money reliabi influence the behavior of stock prices
and that there appear-s to he no statistically significan
change in this n-esponse acr-oss the differ-ent monetary
policy regimes.
The general hvpothesis about disco unit n-ate
changes on stock prices does riot fare so well as the
hypothesis about the effects of unanticipated changes
in Ml . Disconnt tate changes generally bach a positive
but not statistically significant (5 per’cenl bevel) eftect
on stock prices before October 1979 and after October
i982. This resuht does riot support the view that dis—
count i-ate increases should negatively influence stock
prices. It does, however, support the notion that, chun’—
ing pei-iocis in) which monetary policy emphasizes the
behavior of the feder-al funds rate, the discount rate
may not impart relevant policy information not ah—
r-eady contained in, for examphe, the federal funds
i-ate,.~”
The results for the October 1979 to October’ 1982
period indicate that changes in the discount ‘ate
result in stock price niovenients generally consistent
with the li~pothesisdescr-ibed above. Changes in the
discount rate have a significant (one—tailedm negative
10This evidence is in sharp contrast tothe results from studies examin-
ing the interest-rate/money relationshipover this period.
‘°ltshould be noted that the discount rate changes during the pre-
October 1979 period are positive and significant at the 10 percent
bevel for all of the indexes except SPUTIL. For a possible explana-
tion of this result, see the shaded insert on page 8.
effect on all indexes during this period. excel)t for- the
SPTRAN index. The size of the estimated coefficients,
however, is lower for the mon-e narr-owly definn-md in-
dexes than it is for the bi-oad SPSOO and SIMOn mea-
sures. ‘Ihus, a too basis—point increase in the discount
rate chur’ing this pen’iod led to a6 0basis—point dechine
in the growth rate of SP500 and SP400, hut only a 28
basis—point dr-op in the growth n-ate of the SPtJ’t’l L
index.
Why ar-e the effects of discount i-ate chatiges Sc)
different across the difi’etent hJohicy r-egiuies? Pt-ion’ It)
October i979, movements in the federal tinrids r’ate
directly conveyed information about changes in pOh
icy objectives, tItus making the infon’mational content
of discount rate changes r’edundant.’ A similar argu-
ment can he made about the post—October 1982 pe-
riod, since the switch fr’oni a nonbot-n-owed to a bor-
rowed r’eserx’es tar’geting procedure is similar to a
policy that smooths movements in the feder-at funds
rate,” The finding that the estimated coefficients on
“The evidence in the shaded insert on page 8 and accounts of
discount rate changes in the WaI/ Street Journal do notsupport the
gross generality of this view,
‘if a borrowings target (referred to asthe borrowings assumption) is
used and the primary determinant of discount window borrowing is
the federal-lunds-rateidiscount~rate spread, increases in the funds
rate, ceteris paribus, necessitate an increase in reserves since
borrowings will otherwise increase, Thus, reserves are injected, the
funds rate falls and borrowings return to their desired level, This
policy scenario suggests that movements of the federal funds rate
after October 1982 again directly reflect policy objectives. For a
more completediscussion, see Gilbert,discount rate changes an-c insignificantly different
fi-om zero during the two difl’enont policy r-egirnes
suggests that the market’s perception of changes in
the discount n-ate may not be any diffen-ent after Octo-
ben 1982 than it wasbefore October 1979,
The test results in table 2 indicate that the discount
rate change is an important variable in explaining the
behavior of the broad indexes, hut is less so for the
more specialized groups. In fact, the repon-ted F—
statistic forthe SPUTIL index indicates that we cannot
rejectthe hypothesis that changes in the discount rate
togetherl’rave no significant effect,f lie test results also
reveal that the effect of discount i-ate changes is not
equal across r-egirnes at reasonable levels of signifi-
cance (except for SPUTIL),
Finally, the estimated coefficient on the discount
rate surcharge (DRS is highly significant and negative
for each of the stock price indexes tested. The magni-
tude ofthe effect on the broad stock pricenieasures is
similat- to that found by Pear-ce and lIoley 119851; in
addition, all of the stock pt-ice measures at-c affected.
In fact, unlike the results fon’ the discount rate, which
tend to have a smaller effect on the nat-rower indexes,
a change in the sut-charge rate actually had a larger
impact on the nat-n-ow indexes -
To summarize, the hypothesis that only unantici-
pated changes in money negatively influence the
movement of stock pr-ices cannot be n’ejected. ‘this
finding, which holds for- most of the stock price in—
dexes used and time pen-iods tested, supports the
efficient markets hypothesis, rejects the money de-
mand hypothesis and corroborates earlier results
based solely onthe use ofbr-oad stock price indexes. It
also shows that the effect of discount t’ate changes
varies among the particular-indexes and over the per-i—
ods tested, Thus, although policy regime changes do
riotappear to influence the market’s reaction to unan-
ticipated changes in money, the evidence suggests
that the information conveyed through discount tate
changes varies acn-oss p°1~y r-egimes.
itt i/ieiiis
Anals ts gener-ally assunie that positive and nega—
ive unanticipated changes in money have svtnni)ett-i—
cal influences on stock prices.’’ ‘I’d) test ttiis hypothe—
‘-‘Little research into the symmetry of the effects is available, Although
Pearce and Roley (1983) and Rotey and Troll (1983) test for the
effects on interest rates when money changes are above or below
stated policy targets, this does not directly address the hypothesis.
Also, Pearce and Rotey (1983) present similar tests for stock prices.
sis, we again use zet-o—one dummy var-iahles to
genet-ate the appropriate inter-action ten-ms that differ-
entiate positive and negative observations of tIM,
Table 3 presents the results of this test, Positive
values of UM are denoted by PM 1+); negative values
by PM — ).“ Negative unexpected changes in money
have no statistically significant effect on stock prices
using the SP500, SP400 and the SPTIIAN indexes, In
each case, the repor-ted t—values ar-c quite small, as ar-c
the estimated coefficients. tn tests of the equality of
the coefficients on the positive and negative values of
PM, we find that, for these three stock price measur-es,
the t—statistics are fat-ge enough to reject equality at
the 5 percent level, It appear-s that only positive values
of PM have significant effects on changes in these
stock pr-ices; the gt-owth rates of these indexes fell by
16 basis points fon a $1 billion surptise in Ml - This
result suggests that nxiatket efficiency is violated.’-’
The SPUTtL and SPEIN r-esults indicate that both
positive and negative values ofPM have similan-, statis-
tically significant effects on the stock ptice changes. In
these instances, the calculated t-statistics to test coef-
ficietit equality at-c well below any acceptable level of
significance. The symmetrical response of utility and
financial stocks to an unanticipated increase or de-
crease in the money stock indicates that these stocks
are relatively more sensitive to inter-est rate and price
level movements than other stocks.
The r-esults of tins study genen-ally support the ef-
ficient markets hypothesis. Based on evidence froni
several different stock pr-ice indexes, unanticipated
changes in money have a statistically significant effect
On_i stock pr-ices. Expected changes in money never
display a statistically significant effect, ‘the estimated
effect of unanticipated changes in money did not
differ across alternative monetary policy regimes. One
‘4Values of zero are included in the UM (+) data, Discount rate
variables are omitted from the SPUTIL equation, because the evi-
dence in table 2 indicatesthat they are not significant (jointly) at any
reasonable level, It should be noted that reestimation of the equa-
tions in table 3 using a seemingly unrelated regression procedure
does not alter the conclusions reached in this section.
“Gikas Hardouvelis, in private correspondence, suggests the fol-
lowing scenario, Consider the median forecaster lacing the money
announcement with equal probability that the announced Ml figure
wilt be above or below the forecast, Given the results in table 3. the
strategy is to sell before the announcement, since a positive sur-
prise in money will lower stock prices white a negative surprise has
no statistical effect, It such response persists, market efficiency is




Variable SP500 5P400 SPTRAN SPUTIL SPAN
Constant 0048 0,049 0,067 0 024 0.040
(2,18) (216) (190) (1.20) (1.32)
UM( ) 0,162 0.164 0 66 —0.120 0153
(5,07) (4 93) (4.01) (5 75) (4 56)
UM( ) 0046 0041 coos 0086 —0.072
(1,24) (1,08) (013) (3.65) (1 89)
D1DR 0937 1,059 1, 95 0955
(1 81) (1 96) (1.77) (I 74)
D2DR 0,604 0607 0340 - 0,446
(239) (2.30) (1 03) (1 66)
D3DR 1,232 1341 1.432 0394
(1 57) (1 64) (1.40) (0 47)
DAS 0403 0.391 0467 — 0.551 0637
(2.49) (2.32) (2.21) (5.22) (3,71)
248 252 2.75 1.07 158
R 0.022 DM21 0.015 0.039 0025
5 0.876 0.912 1.164 0597 0952
DW 1.79 1,82 2.00 1 98 2.01
p 0,19 0.27 0 23
(838) (11.73) (994)
NOT - The reported t statistic isbased on testnng the hypothe I that UM () = UM ( ) An a tern k
denotessignificance at 5 percent level, All other terms are defnned in table 1
result that does not upport tIm eltrn-ienn in-ii-kets
li~potlli si- is the liniding tlm’nt the rIled-, of inalitidi
pated riM,ne~ n-haiiges are as\ in netinc onl~po mi’e Batten Dalta S - nd Daniel L Thornton Th Di count Rate
al tres of uiiantnct )~nted(‘liariges in morn a~ )~(ar to Intere t Rat and Foreign Exchange Rate An Analysi with
-- - — - Daily Dat “this Review (February 1985) pp 22—30
ha~ e a srgnimfncanit iriipa n on tht Sl&0t) ‘,P400 and
519 Ii \N meastrix -- Branch Ben Common Stock Performance and Inflation An Inter
national Compan on Journal of Business (January 1974) pp
IIin’ (‘tIed ts ot discor nut ‘ntt changt s0 ii stoc k It in es 48 52
an \\ ith r hanges in niiorietai-~ 1)01ic\ nor -enIni-es Coate, D and Jame VanderHoff Stock R turns, Inflation and
their influeni e also le sd len I a-, Ilie sIor k Pr ice i ri i\ Real Output unpublished mann cript, Rutg rs University (Janu
- any 1985) forthcomingEconom, Inquiry
her anile nan-r-o~~ er In gener-al dnsr-ount ate banges
lm-r~e si ‘nil in- rnt ne°-tthe efh ts on stock hid s on l\ Cohn Richard A and Donald R Le ard The Effect of Inflation -- - I - on Stock Prices- International Evidence Journal ofFin 0cc (May
ti-our Octohei’ lDi9 to Or toiler 1982 a pn’i rod r liar’ n Icr-— 1981) pp 277 89
n/c d by a iimonetar\ p01 mn-S that lot ti-a rI on r-ont oil ng Corn II Bradford The Mon y Supply Announcements Puzzle
nonbor-n-owed reserves. l3cfonc arid alter that per iOdl Reviewand Interpretation, Amencan Econorni Review (Septem
discon iii ‘ate liariges cons ~ In ttie adclittonal ii iion - ber 1983) pp 644—57
muatton about pours David on Lawreri e S nd Richard T Froyen Mon tary Policyand Stock Returns: Are Stock Markets Efficient?” this Review
(March1982), pp. 3—12.
Folk, Barry, and Peter F. Orazem, “The Money Supply Announce-
ments Puzzle: Comment,” American Economic Review (June
1985), pp. 562—64,
Fama, Eugene F., Lawrence Fisher, Michael C- Jensen and Richard
Roll, “The Adlustment ofStock Prices to New Information,” Inter-
national Economic Review (February 1969), pp. 1—21.
Fama, Eugene F., and G. William Schwert, “Asset Returns and
Inflation,” Journal of Financial Economics (November 1977), pp.
115—46,
Fama, Eugene F. “Stock Returns, Real Activity, Inflation, and
Money,” American Economic Review (September 1981), pp. 545—
65.
Feldstein, Martin, “Inflation and the Stock Market.” American Eco-
nomic Review (December1980). pp. 839—47,
French, Kenneth R. “Stock Returns and the Weekend Effect,”
JournalofFinancial Economics (March 1980), pp. 55—69,
Gibbons, Michael R., and Patrick Hess, “Day of the Week Effects
and Asset Returns,” Journal of Business (October 1981). pp 579—
96.
Gilbert, R. Alton, “Operating Procedures for Conducting Monetary
Policy,” this Review (February 1985), pp 13—21 -
Gultekin, N. Bulent, “Stock Market Returns and Inflation Fore-
casts,” Journal of Finance (June 1983). pp. 663—73.
Hardouvelis. Gikas A. “Macroeconomic Information and Stock
Prices,” unpublished manuscript. Columbia University (Septem-
ber 1985).
Hasbrouck. Joel, “Stock Returns, Inflation, and Economic Activity:
The Survey Evidence,” Journal ofFinance (December 1984), pp.
1293—310,
Hem, Scott E, “The Response of Short-Term Interest Rates to
Weekly Money Announcements: Comment,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking (May 1985), pp. 264—71 -
Kessel, Reuben A., and Arrnen A. Alchian, “Effects of Inflation,”
JournalofPolitical Economy (December 1962), pp 521—37,
King, Benfamin F. “Market and Industry Factors in Stock Price
Behavior,” Journal ofBusiness (January 1966), pp 139—90.
Kool,Clemens J.M.. and R. W. Hater, “Inflation and Stock Prices: A
Long Term View,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working
Paper No. 86-001 (January 1986).
Lloyd-Davies. P., and Michael Canes. “Stock Prices and the Publi-
APPENDIX
Data Definitions
The expected change in the money supply IEMI is
the median fon-ecast obtained fioni Money Market
Services, inc. (MMSL
Since 1977 this firm has condueted a weekly tele-
phone survey ofSO to 60 gos’em-nnienmt securities dealers
to obtain their fon-ecast of the chartge in Ml - Isefor-e
Februan-v8, 1980, the survey wasconducted twice each
cation of Second-Hand information,” JournalofBusiness (January
1978), pp. 43—56.
Niederhoffer, Victor, “The Analysis of World Events and Stock
Prices,” Journal ofBusiness (April1971), pp. 193—219,
Nelson, Charles R, “Inflation and Rates of Return on Common
Stocks,” JournalofFinance (May 1976), pp. 471—82,
Pearce. Douglas K, “An Empirical Analysis ofExpected StockPrice
Movements,” Journal ofMoney, Credit and Banking (August1984).
pp. 317—27.
Pearce, Douglas K,, and V. Vance Roley. “The Reaction on Stock
Prices to Unanticipated Changes in Money: A Note,” Journal of
Finance (September 1983), pp. 1323—33.
“Stock Prices and Economic News,” Journal of Busi-
ness (January 1985), pp. 49—67,
Roley, V. Vance. and Rick Troll, “The Impact of New Economic
Information on the Volatilityof Short-Term Interest Rates,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review (February 1983),
pp. 3—15.
________ “The Impact of Discount Rate Changes on Market
Interest Rates,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic
Review (January 1984), pp. 27—39.
Rozeff, M, S. “Money and Stock Prices: Market Efficiency and the
Lag in Effect of Monetary Policy,” Journalof Financial Economics
(September 1974), pp 245—302.
Santoni, G. J, “The Effects of Inflation on Commercial Bank Stock
Prices,” this Review (forthcoming 1986).
Schwert. G- William, “The Adjustment of Stock Prices to Informa-
tion About Inflation.” Journal ofFinance (March 1981), pp. 15—29,
Sheehan, Richard G, “Weekly Money Announcements: New Infor-
mation and Its Effects,” this Review (August/September1985). pp.
25—34,
Smirlock, Michael, and JessYawitz, “Asset Returns, Discount Rate
Changes, and Market Efficiency.” Journal ofFinance (September
1985), pp. 1141—58,
Sprinkel, Beryl W. Money and Stock Prices (Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1964).
Sorensen, Eric H- “Rational Expectations and the Impact of Money
upon Stock Prices,” Journal ofFinancial and Quantitative Analysis
(December 1982), pp. 649—62,
Wallich, Henry C, “Recent Techniques of Monetary Policy.” Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review (May 1984),
pp. 21—30,
week, initially on Tuesday, with a follow—up call on
Thursday, allowing n-espondents to alter’their or-iginal
guess. Fn-onm February 1980 through Fehruany 1984,
howeven’, tile surve was conducted only or_i ‘l’uesday.
because of the t”eden-al Reserve’s shift in announcing
the weekly Ml figures fn’om ‘t’hi.rn’sday to Fr-ida after’—
noon, Beginn_iing Febrrrary 1984. whir/h con’n-esporids to
the change from lagged to contemporaneous resetve
accounting and with the announcement day again
heing cilatigedi ft-ore Friday to ‘l’hiursday afternoon.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1986
ivtN’lS once again trsed two surveys: the initial poll on
the Friday ini_imediatefy l’ouowing the Thur-sday money
announcement and again on the following ‘tuesday,
For ti_is study, we use the forecasts from the ‘tuesday
sur’vev, ‘[‘lie data used Iiccc are those fr-ott) Pean-ce and
Roley (19851 as updated bytJoug Pearce, Wewould like
to thank him for- making these as well as the ad ual Mi
data availahie,
Actual changes in weekly Ml, which appeal’ in the
Federal Reserve’s H. 6statistical i-elease are measured
as the first announced value minus [he fir-st r-evised
estimate of the previous weeks level, Due to the
changing defir_iition of Ml dut-ing our sample, the
following pr-ocedure was l’ohlowed to oh Lain_i a set-ies
consistent with that being forecast by the survey re-
spondents: Until F’ebruar’y 1980, we use the old defin_ii-
tion of Ml, From Fehi-uarv 1980 through Novenibet’
19$ 1, we use the actual MIII measure Inot the M 113
value that was ‘‘shift—adjusted’’ for- the intr-oductior_i of
NOWaccountsl. l”inally, fr-ore November 1981 through_i
ti_icetid of our’sample, \-veuse the ctIr-n-ent definition of
Ml. Giver) the actual at_id expected series br money,
unanticipated changes in Nil IUM I are measured as
actual less expected.
The stock pi’e~e indexes used in thus study are daily
chosevalues of tb_ic broad Stan_idard and Poor’s (SPi 500
and 400 indexes, as well as tb_ic industr~—specifieili—
dexes for ti-anspor-tation iSVt’i-IANI, utilities lSPU’I’hLI
arid finan_icial it_ist ito[ions ISPt”tN I - In each instance,
the stock pr-icechange is n_ieasttred as tb_ic difference of
the iogar-ithms.
Changes in tb_ic Federal Reserve’s discount i-ateand
the sut-chiar’ge ar’enieastrr’ed in per-den_itage poin_its; tb_iat
is, a 100 basis—pon_it ch_iange in_i either’ rate is nieasured
as 1.0. Our-r_iieasurement of the discount n’ale ci_iange,
ur_ilike that in some studies, follows the Federal Re—
serve s official dating pr’ocedur-e. (:hat_iging wi_icr_i One
ofthe 12 Federal Reserve Banks has [he approval of tb_ic
Feden-al Reserve Board to cliar_ige its i-ate. ‘Il_ic data
used here is based on the day ti_ic t_iew rate is it_i effect.
not whim_i the new i-ate is ar_nouniced in the financial
I)tess.